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HHungarian debt taxonomy –  witH international correlationsThe lending to households that exceeds their 
creditworthiness, corporate indebtedness 
and countries falling into the debt trap are 
interrelated and intertwined phenomena which 
have represented one of the gravest problems 
in the world since the 1970s. In proportion to 
the world’s gross domestic product (GDP), a 
marked increase of public debt can be observed 
since the mid-seventies, which increase took on 
new momentum from the 2000s: in 1970, the 
world’s public debt-to-GDP ratio was 25 per 
cent, but 35 and 70 per cent in 2000 and 2010 
respectively.
By the 1990s, the public debt-to-GDP ra-
tio of the united states has doubled from the 
late 1970’s 30 per cent, and since 2010 has 
been permanently in excess of 100 per cent. 
The total debt of euro area member states is 
also close to 100 per cent of GDP (92.1 per 
cent at the end of 2014), which represents a 
rise of one third compared to 2000, however, 
the period before the current crisis was accom-
panied by very strong general growth. In this 
respect, it may be worth comparing france 
and Germany, two West European countries 
with vastly different public finance cultures 
and practices. france’s public debt in 1981 
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was approximately 20 per cent of its GDP, 
which jumped to almost 64 per cent by 2007 
(at the onset of the crisis), then the debt ratio 
rose above 95 per cent as a result of the crisis. 
Germany followed a different path, but overall 
for many years the increase of debt was typi-
cal: the German debt ratio in the mid-nineties 
was at around 55 per cent, then rose to 65 per 
cent by 2007 and above 80 per cent by 20112. 
Naturally, the situation of the Eastern Euro-
pean region was different from that of West-
ern Europe. Between 2004 and 2007, public 
debt in the majority of Eu Member states in 
the region either dropped or stagnated, with 
Hungary being the only exception where the 
debt-to-GDP ratio increased by 31.7 percent-
age points between 2002 and 2010.
In the case of emerging countries that have 
switched economic systems, assuming they are 
indebted in foreign currency, exchange risk 
unavoidably arises, which − even at the origi-
nal level of debts, converted to national cur-
rency − represents increased and in many cases 
unmanageable debt service. In the 1970s, per-
formance problems, similar to those of other 
countries in the world economy, surfaced in 
Hungary as well. By 1979, total debt exceeded 
usD 10 billion. World economic events, the 
ripple effects of the oil crisis, alongside erro-
neous economic policy and an outdated eco-
nomic structure all played a significant role in 
the continuous increase in loan volume. By the 
start of the political regime change, Hungary’s 
total external debt rose to usD 21 billion.
During the neo-liberal market economy 
transition starting at the end of the 1980s, 
Hungarian economic policy (subject to the 
core philosophy of the Washington consensus 
and enforcing the demands of the IMf which 
pursued a similar ideology) carried out market 
economy reforms. As one of the results of this, 
the growing budget deficit became a perma-
nent system-specific phenomenon3, and the 
austerity measures – in the spirit of the time – 
serving to mitigate said deficit, along with the 
increasing use of foreign loans to bridge the 
deficit also became general characteristics of 
the Hungarian regime changing economy. The 
budget deficit and the accompanying public 
debt became unmanageable as a result of the 
government policy emerging as of 2002, the 
effects of which – in spite of successful fiscal 
consolidation carried out between 2010 and 
2013 – are felt to this day.4 New governments 
after the turn of the millennium on the one 
hand overspent and on the other, enforced 
the taxation of international companies and 
banks below their actual tax capacity. Between 
the 2002 government change and 2010, the 
public debt-to-GDP ratio increased from 53.6 
to 85.3 per cent. This in itself served as veri-
fication that the neo-liberal economic policy 
pursued up until 2010 could no longer be 
maintained. Meanwhile, between 2002 and 
2010, debt volume swiftly accumulated both 
in the local subsystem of public finances and 
at the level of families, and became unman-
ageable by 20085. The phenomenon that oc-
curred in Hungary as well was that after some 
time, the public debt increase resulting from 
the neo-liberal economic policy, which only 
marginally impacts the economy, does not co-
ordinate market players adequately and only 
regulates and audits to a slight extent, gener-
ated a decentralisation process, allowing, or in 
fact forcing local governments and the popu-
lation to become indebted. (see Chart 1).
The beginning of the 1990s saw a signifi-
cant decentralisation of tasks commence from 
the central budget sector towards the sub-
system of local governments within public 
finances. The deployment of tasks, however 
was not followed by the decentralisation of 
central resources, especially not at real value, 
so by the turn of the millennium, there was a 
significant operating deficit in the local pub-
lic finance subsystem. The decentralisation of 
deficit within public finances became a gen-
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eral characteristic and soon afterwards the 
total debt of public finances also fell into a 
decentralisation vacuum. The value of total 
loan and bond volume increased from Huf 
491 billion in 2007 to two and a half times 
this value, to Huf 1,247 billion by 2010. By 
2008–2010, the neo-liberal economic phi-
losophy that generated the debt also proved 
to be a failure at the second level of public 
finances. An immense and irrepayable, for the 
most part foreign currency-based debt volume 
was accumulated. settlements took out loans 
in particular to ensure own funds of the Eu 
investments that started in 2004.6
The deficit arising in the central and the lo-
cal government system, the accumulation of 
deficit and public debt are the consequences 
of the inadequately organised operation of the 
state, which is an international phenomenon. 
In an environment where the state operates 
with low efficiency, it is unable to adequately 
take care of its citizens and provide them with 
work and ‘expected levels’ of income. This is 
compensated at an increasing rate by the com-
mercial banks’ retail loans ‘authorised’, regu-
lated and tolerated by governments and cen-
tral banks. As state operation weakens and as 
a result public debt increases, the debt volume 
held by households rises concurrently.
HouseHolds in tHe debt traP
Between 2004 and 2008, total us retail debt 
increased from usD 8,000 billion to over usD 
12,500 billion7, and as a result of financial 
globalisation, this loan dynamic also became a 
general phenomenon in other countries of the 
world8. The household indebtedness process 
in Hungary was amplified by the permanent 
mood of Hungarian consumers ‘awaiting 
paradise’ and frustrated within the planned 
Chart 1 
Public debt-to-GdP ratio in HunGary, 1998–2015
Source: based on mnb data, 2015
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economic system, as well as the fact that the 
regime change failed to bring about income 
convergence.
1.5 million employees were let go from 
Hungarian state-owned companies and large 
state farms that were ‘run into the ground’ by 
the time of and during the economic trans-
formation. Their labour market integration 
has yet to be resolved to this day by domiciled 
international companies that have become the 
backbone of national economy production. 
Meanwhile, through the increased global pres-
ence, in other words the globalisation of fi-
nancial, service provider and production com-
panies, the favoured social models9, the ideal 
of the consumer society and the us model of 
financing consumption through commercial 
loans 10 also became worldwide phenomena.
The neo-liberal economic policy and the 
resulting state operation with deficit and 
public debt which was also applied in emerg-
ing, developing countries, however, failed to 
raise the income levels of the people to the 
level of the ‘Western’ world. When examining 
this phenomenon in European union Mem-
ber states, the substantial difference between 
hourly wages in the private sectors of west-
ern core countries and eastern Eu states (to 
the detriment of the latter) is striking to this 
day. In 2012, hourly wage in the Eu 27 was 
EuR 23.50, compared to EuR 28.20 in the 
euro area. It was EuR 41.90 in sweden, EuR 
34.90 in france and EuR 31 in Germany. In 
Hungary this value was only EuR 7.9, but in 
countries to the east of us, in Romania and 
Bulgaria this was EuR 4.5 and 3.7 respective-
ly. Hungarian incomes, therefore, were 72 per 
cent below the monetary zone average, and 81 
and 74.5 per cent below swedish and German 
labour wages respectively11.
Meanwhile, the propensity of the Hungar-
ian population to consume, and the nature, 
rate, target group and intensity of consump-
tion is the same as that of the German or 
scandinavian societies. The social welfare sys-
tem was meant to fill, or to be more precise 
reduce, the gap between wages and consump-
tion needs, however, on account of the lack 
of funds, or even the deficit of the state and 
the local level, it is unable to fulfil this role. In 
order to bridge this gap, the missing solvent 
demand was supplemented by the commer-
cial bank system (which also started shifting 
towards the retail segment on the Hungarian 
money market) through its special foreign 
currency loan packages. The propensity to 
consume was not satisfied by labour-based in-
comes, but rather by way of loans.
In the unstable state financial environment 
between 2002 and 2010, the total cash and 
deposit volume held by the population in-
creased by 95.6 per cent12, while its loan port-
folio expanded to five and a half times its for-
mer size and edged close to Huf 11 thousand 
billion13 – while a ‘solid’ inflation path was in 
effect in the interval between 3.5 and 7.9 per 
cent. When examining the key components of 
the retail loan portfolio we find that the value 
of freely usable mortgage loans increased from 
Huf 388 billion in 2005 to Huf 2,556 bil-
lion in 2010, which is more than six and a half 
times more than the former value. consumer 
loans provided to households increased by 
495 per cent between 2004 and 2010. of the 
Huf 3,130 billion recorded in 2010, 68.4 per 
cent was in mortgage loans. foreign currency 
lending played a significant role in Hungarian 
retail lending. see data in Chart 2.14 
In addition to lenient state regulation, the 
tipping of interest rates in favour of foreign 
currencies also played a major role in the for-
eign currency indebtedness of the retail and 
the local government sectors.15
As a result of the international financial cri-
sis, it was primarily the weakening of the forint 
against the swiss franc and the euro that increased 
the repayment instalments of households, local 
governments and companies indebted in foreign 
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currency16, which at a time already burdened by 
high unemployment and low wages and in an 
indebted public finance environment was par-
ticularly shocking. The basic problem of foreign 
currency lending implemented in Hungary was 
that it lacked self-restraint on both the supply 
and the demand side and it disregarded the bor-
rowing capacity of debtors.
resPonsibility taxonomy and risks 
– lost illusions
The problem of state, local government and 
household indebtedness beyond general 
loan dependency occurs when the foreign 
currency revenues of debtors dry up or if they 
have no such revenues at all and repayment 
is due. In such cases, repayment in foreign 
currency (especially if this happens during a 
time when national currency is depreciated) 
places considerable debt service and surplus 
cost coverage burdens on debtors. The foreign 
currency indebtedness of the Hungarian state 
in the socialist planned economy caused 
difficulties on account of the weakening 
of the export performance of industry and 
agriculture17. Local governments or the 
population had very little foreign currency-
based revenues, practically none actually. 
Loan repayment after the expiration of the 
grace period greatly impacts the sustainable 
financial management of both the debtor 
and the creditor, with the failure to repay the 
loan generating chain-reaction-like instability 
effects in the national economy.
Chart 2
tHe cHanGe in tHe foreiGn currency exPosure of HunGarian HouseHolds before 
and after consolidation (2005–2015)
Source: based on data from the national bank of Hungary, 2015
Household FCY loans       Household HUF loans
Household loan portfolio in proportion to GDP (scale on the right)
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The status brought about in respect of lend-
ing is decidedly of a market nature. Loan de-
mand, i.e. demand by those looking to bor-
row, appears and there are lending companies 
that provide loans. Looking at market nature, 
therefore, the credit market features banks as 
the embodiment of supply and households 
(with increasing needs) and other borrow-
ers as the embodiment of demand. The state 
regulates and audits loan supply, loan dynam-
ics and denomination through its macro- and 
micro-prudential authorities, or pursues the 
principle of not intervening or only to a mini-
mal extent18 to manipulate or control the pro-
cesses. It should be noted, however, that the 
state also bears primary responsibility for the 
failure to intervene into the operation of the 
market, as well as for the development and 
toleration of ‘autonomous’ lending processes 
that exceeded the borrowing capacity of loan 
applicants. The responsibility of regulation or 
non-regulation both fall upon the state. Non-
intervention into market processes appears at 
the system-level in the operation of govern-
ments pursuing neo-liberal ideas and in that 
of their supervisory authorities, representing 
the essence of the given system. from us sub-
prime markets to central and Eastern Euro-
pean foreign currency loans denominated in 
swiss franc, the system in each case collapsed 
due to inappropriate regulation. The crisis 
first hit market players where they were most 
vulnerable: household lending. The crisis fol-
lowed from the of nature of the system and 
as a result there is more to it than a simple 
subprime mortgage market or banking crisis. 
We are faced with the crisis of the neo-liberal 
system, characterised by a lax stance towards 
market automatisms, minimal regulation and 
supervision.
In addition to the weak regulatory and 
supervisory power of the neo-liberal system, 
banks are also responsible together with the 
families and households that embody the de-
mand side in that they took out loans and 
committed to repayment obligations far ex-
ceeding their realistically expected income 
revenues. Going back to the initial stages, 
the increasingly indebted governments are 
also responsible in that they operated under 
an economic policy scheme that was generat-
ing deficit and then laid down the regulatory 
framework that made excessive debt possible, 
while doing nothing to curb over- lending. 
Therefore, the roots of the local government 
and household debt problem are threefold, 
19where the majority of the responsibility lies 
not with the demand, that is the loan appli-
cants. The transition of the state into the role 
of a long-term borrower is 20a direct conse-
quence of the neo-liberal economic policies 
applied or of policies leading in that direction, 
and it is later also transferred to additional in-
ternal residents. The responsibility of the bor-
rowers – who have a lower level of insight into 
the system and a limited understanding of 
how banks operate – is significantly reduced 
as a result of the communication of the au-
thorities and the banks designed to mask the 
problems and their aggressive business policies 
aimed at credit expansion.
The base currency of the proliferation of 
foreign currency lending in Hungary was the 
swiss franc. foreign currency loans were con-
cluded in the currency of the Alpine coun-
try that had not seen war for centuries and 
could attribute its wealth and affluence to 
its banks. The Hungarian population that is 
characterised by a low level of financial liter-
acy saw security in the swiss currency, which 
culminated in the strong escalation of for-
eign currency loans, due to the credit greed 
of the population and the lack of information 
provided by the banks. The regulatory activi-
ties of the governing powers that had already 
been in political crisis in 2004 and from 2006 
onwards did not cover the assessment of the 
borrowing capacity and income earning capa-
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bility of residential groups, did not establish 
conditions relative to the size of the collateral 
items pledged nor did they require banks to 
create such conditions.
The problem was further exasperated by 
the fact that these 10–30 year loans that were 
accounted in swiss francs had no underlying 
banking funds21 for coverage for a correspond-
ing 10–30-year term, or mainly swiss franc 
denominated coverage on the liability-side, 
i.e. on balance sheet.22 In the critical period 
between 2004 and 2008, the monetary base 
portfolio of the swiss franc barely changed, 
which may lend itself to the conclusion that 
the collateral side of the swiss franc credit 
fever beginning to take shape in the Eastern 
European region, but mainly in Hungary – 
judging from the data provided by the swiss 
central bank – could not have been covered 
with swiss franc base money, controlled by 
the monetary authority.23
A significant part of Hungarian households 
that took out foreign currency loans were not 
(would not have been) creditworthy in the 
domestic currency, which is why they would 
not have been granted Hungarian forint loans. 
on a side note, obviously there are no perma-
nent, bank technical solutions that could turn 
an uncreditworthy client into a creditworthy 
one, not the least by changing the currency 
of the loan. This contradiction, however, was 
“successfully” overcome by the strong credit 
product sales campaigns of credit brokers, 
the outdatedness and laxness of credit under-
writing indices, the business interests of the 
banks and – not insignificantly – the super-
ficial judgment of credit hungry clients with 
regard to their own creditworthiness and the 
non-regulating state that was only interested 
in increasing (albeit only temporarily) the 
wealth of banks and their clients, all of which 
reinforced one another and turned a blind eye 
on each other’s faults. It has, however, been 
proven that long-term wealth and affluence 
cannot be built from loans, not even at the 
level of households.
tHe logic and results oF debt 
consolidation
By the autumn of 2008, the total debt of the 
state, local governments and the population 
became unmanageable, in part due to the 
high volume of debt, and in part on account 
of the currency denomination of that debt. 
In the period after the summer of 2010, after 
the government change, the first round of 
measures focused on the budget and avoiding 
the collapse of the social security system. 
fiscal consolidation was concluded by 2013, 
and Hungary was removed from under the 
excessive deficit procedure of the Europe-
an union.24 It was in essence after this that 
the bailout process of foreign currency loan 
indebted local governments and households 
amplified25, which process mitigated the 
default risk26 of Hungary per national 
economy sectors.
In order to keep market players and the 
whole of public finances functioning, the 
Hungarian government took on a regulatory 
and supervisory role where it was able to di-
rectly influence financial conditions. The pre-
vailing notion of the neo-liberal market econ-
omy model – which holds that market players 
are capable of self- and sectoral regulation, 
and creating balance – was replaced by the 
state playing an active part in the regulation 
of the economy. It regulates and supervises the 
operation of market players. It mitigates the 
enforcement of the Washington consensus. 
It aims to increase national wealth, centralis-
es control and manipulates market processes 
through state instruments.
The government curbs deficit and manages 
public debt with a fiscal policy aimed at shar-
ing burdens. It integrated the debt rule into 
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the fundamental Law and the subordinated 
cardinal acts. With the state consolidation of 
local governments between 2011 and 2014, 
the avoidance of national bankruptcy was ex-
tended to another segment of public finances. 
With and after this, in addition to ensuring 
general revenue increase for households, the 
state also took administrative financial meas-
ures aimed at reducing loan repayment instal-
ments27. The Hungarian government acted 
as consolidator in all three segments. In fact, 
apart from the assumption of local govern-
ment debts and the state coordination of the 
repayment schedule and rate of retail loan in-
stalments28, by replacing the foreign currency 
loans of fcY indebted companies and by 
launching investment frameworks, through 
the funding for Growth scheme of the Na-
tional Bank of Hungary29, the liquidity situ-
ation of both debtors and banks improved. 
The Hungarian government eliminated sector 
bankruptcy threats in all areas (public financ-
es, businesses, households) that previously 
made the operation of the state impossible, 
and as such also eliminated the threat of na-
tional bankruptcy.30
The ultimate elimination of the collapse of 
the retail foreign currency loan segment also 
owed to the new type of corporate social re-
sponsibility programme introduced by the 
National Bank of Hungary. In the autumn of 
2014, in order to phase out foreign currency-
based loans, it created the possibility at central 
bank sale tenders – at the expense of foreign 
currency reserves31 – to convert consumer 
foreign currency and foreign currency-based 
mortgage loans to forint in a swift and organ-
ised manner.
At the end of september 2014, the total 
volume of consumer foreign currency and 
foreign currency-based mortgage loans in the 
banking system was Huf 3,350 billion (EuR 
10.8 billion), which after the settlement with 
customers dropped by more than Huf 500 
billion (EuR 1.7 billion). This means that 
the conversion to Huf impacted a debt vol-
ume of EuR 9 billion. At the same time, the 
booked loss in value behind the loan volume 
in question was more than EuR 1.56 billion 
(Huf 480 billion), of which, according to the 
MNB’s calculations, close to EuR 0.4–0.6 
billion (Huf 120–180 billion) was released 
on account of the settlements. consequently, 
the coverage required by the banks in relation 
to the conversion amounts to approximately 
EuR 8 billion. The EuR 7.83 billion allo-
cated at the tender of the Hungarian central 
bank, therefore, means that the banks covered 
practically the whole of the foreign currency 
loan portfolio to be converted to forint. The 
central bank tender allows for the phasing 
out of consumer foreign currency and foreign 
currency-based mortgage loans.32
The MNB’s foreign currency provision 
scheme was set up in a way that the banks’ 
foreign currency needs would be covered and 
in addition the optimal level of central bank 
reserves would not be endangered even if the 
limit amounts are fully utilised.33 The guaran-
tee for the latter is the fact that the instru-
ments made available by the central bank on 
the one hand reduce short-term external debt, 
and as such the foreign currency reserve needs 
of the central bank; and on the other hand 
ensure that the banks fulfil the foreign cur-
rency demands arising from the conversion to 
forint through the appropriately spread out 
and gradual utilisation of foreign currency re-
serves, to be achieved in the next 3 years.
foreign currency loans were actually and 
formally converted to forint in the spring of 
2015. With their euro purchases, commercial 
banks covered the exchange risk stemming 
from the conversion, which is indispensable 
when it comes to ensuring the continuous 
operation of banks. In the case of the euro, 
the exchange rate was set at34 Huf 308.97, 
and Huf 256.6 for the swiss franc. Although 
 focus – spotlight on the financial “Innovations” 
Public Finance Quarterly  2015/3 305
the exchange rates were higher at the phase-
out than at the time of the start of these loans 
between 2002 and 200835, the objective of 
the government and the central bank was not 
only to bail-out household foreign currency 
borrowers, but also to bring banks to a con-
solidated financial position, meaning that the 
Hungarian public finance government imple-
mented a complex consolidation underpinned 
by the Act on fair Banks and the banks’ obli-
gation to compensate clients for the losses suf-
fered as a result of undue contractual amend-
ments.36
The fiscal and facilitating monetary author-
ity cannot limit itself to consolidation and 
bailout activity in the future, or to the direct 
or indirect implementation of such activity. It 
is a fact, however, that the state also took out 
loans to finance its low efficiency operation 
that lasted decades (instead of taking out these 
loans for investments). Local governments 
and the population also became indebted in 
a neo-liberal, lenient and powerless market 
economy environment, due to products that 
failed to generate direct yield, the systemic na-
ture of which environment produced state tax 
revenues and led to the reduction of wages, 
and as such also led to the prevalence of the 
‘tendency’ to generate deficit and debt, even 
in terms of the population. The necessity of a 
mass bailout prior to collapse, however, is in-
disputable37. The market players, families and 
local governments indebted in foreign cur-
rency loans are not primarily responsible for 
their indebtedness. In the neo-liberal financial 
environment, the institution or household in 
need of bailing out is not to blame for their 
bankruptcy, but rather the economic policy 
that brought about this situation38. However, 
the government, stepping into a more active 
role, had to take responsibility for the insti-
tutions and social groups that were forced 
into indebtedness39. To have applied a hard, 
bigoted, normative budget constraint against 
bankrupt institutions and households, to have 
allowed them to become fully dysfunctional 
would have led to confusion in state opera-
tion and the dissolution of the social and sub-
sequently the legal order. After having suc-
cessfully concluded fiscal consolidation, the 
government came to the rescue of its other 
institutions and social groups.
ePilogue
on 15 January 2015 the National Bank of 
switzerland gave up its protection against the 
volatility of the Euro exchange rate. As a result, 
the money and capital markets of the world 
experienced significant exchange rate volatility. 
The exchange rate of the swiss franc against 
the euro “nosedived” from 1.2 to 0.8052 in 
a matter of seconds, while the Huf/cHf 
exchange rate soared from the 250–260 band 
to 378, peaking, for a short while – at private 
brokers – above 400.40 Therefore, the removal 
of the peg strengthened the swiss franc 
further, while significantly weakening the 
euro, and in particular the Hungarian forint, 
which could have had very grave consequences 
for Hungarian families and municipalities 
indebted in swiss francs, had their state-led 
consolidation failed to take place.
Precedent: on 16 september 2011 the Na-
tional Bank of switzerland decided to cap the 
exchange rate of the swiss franc against the euro 
at 1.2: meaning that the central bank started 
selling cHf when the exchange rate came close 
to the cap. until the beginning of 2015, the 
swiss national currency has been under con-
stant strengthening pressure, which caused 
the euro amounts to continuously increase in 
the safe of the National Bank of switzerland, 
while the euro exchange rate against the us 
dollar has deteriorated significantly. Therefore, 
in essence, the National Bank of switzerland 
was able to avoid a further appreciation of the 
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franc by purchasing a depreciating currency. 
The implementation of the quantitative eas-
ing programme of the European central Bank, 
rumoured since the summer of 2012, has be-
come more topical than ever, which, however, 
would have brought about further euro depre-
ciation coupled with a further appreciation of 
the swiss franc. on 14 January 2015, the Eu-
ropean court of Justice decided that there were 
no obstacles to the planned bond issue by the 
EcB. following the decision, it already seemed 
certain that the quantitative easing programme 
would be launched,41 while it was not in the 
interest of the swiss central bank either to keep 
intervening ad infinitum, in other words, make 
sacrifices for the good of the European mon-
etary area.42
The discontinuation of the swiss currency 
peg, in the event that the approximately cHf 
20 billion exposure had remained, would 
have had catastrophic impact on the Hungar-
ian lending market43. Due to the elimination 
by the government and the central bank of 
household, corporate and local government 
exposure44, however, the swiss decision did 
not impact the majority of Hungarian mar-
ket players any longer. In recent years, the 
Hungarian government and central bank con-
sciously strived to reduce the foreign currency 
exposure of public finances, companies and 
households. The Hungarian public finance 
system proved its resilience.
The government and central bank effort 
aimed at the complete elimination of the retail 
foreign currency loan portfolio remaining after 
the conversion of mortgage loans to forint is 
also part of this. In the interest of the ‘bailout’ 
of car loan debtors indebted in foreign cur-
rency and those with personal loans denomi-
nated in foreign currency, in the summer of 
2015 the MNB and the government reached 
a decision to convert these loans to forint too, 
which means that these retail loans, that are 
extremely dangerous due to the exchange risk 
and which consequently threaten financial and 
social stability, could be phased out from the 
Hungarian financial system for good.
The phasing out of foreign currency loans 
substantially decreases the external vulner-
ability of the Hungarian economy, which 
is in the interest of the national economy. 
This is strengthened by the reduction of the 
state’s external debt, which is also supported 
by the central bank’s self-financing scheme. 
The factors behind the reduction of foreign 
currency exposure include the consolidation 
of the public finance and household foreign 
currency loan volume, the discontinuation of 
processes that generate excessive budget defi-
cit, the increase of the activity of the domes-
tic population on the government securities 
market and the financing of public debt from 
within45, in other words, the strengthening of 
self-financing46.
Notes
1 This manuscript is an edited, expanded and up-
dated version of the author’s book chapter entitled 
‘A túlhitelezés globalizálódása a világban és Mag-
yarországon’ (The Globalisation of over-Lending 
Across the World and in Hungary) and his lecture 
entitled ‘Devizahitelezés: áldás vagy átok?’ (foreign 
currency Lending: Blessing or curse?) delivered at 
the Ludovika open university of the National uni-
versity of Public service. (In: A devizahitelezés nagy 
kézikönyve (The comprehensive Handbook of for-
eign currency Lending). Nemzeti Közszolgálati és 
Tankönyv Kiadó, Budapest, 2015)
2 This was followed by a slight adjustment, and by au-
tumn 2014 German public debt dropped below 75 
per cent of GDP.
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3 As György Matolcsy put it: In the four decades be-
tween 1974–2014, one of the most typical traits of 
Hungarian economy was the lack of permanent fi-
nancial equilibrium. Matolcsy, 2015. p. 15
4 Its impacts are felt to this day as our gross financ-
ing need as a percentage of GDP was 23.8 and 19.6 
per cent in 2014 and 2015 respectively. In the same 
time frame, Egypt: 45.5–45.1 per cent, Pakistan 
29.2–30.6 per cent. They are followed in emerging 
market economy rankings by Hungary. The closest 
to us in terms of values are croatia and the ukraine, 
with 19.7–19.3 and 16.4–16.3 per cent respectively. 
Based on IMf data.
5 In the autumn of 2008, Hungary was saved from 
sovereign default by the usD 25 billion loan pro-
vided by the IMf, the WB and the EcB.
6 for a detailed description of local government in-
debtedness and consolidation, see: Lentner, 2014 
(Public finance Quarterly)
7 As a result of the crisis, nominal decrease was ob-
served until mid–2013, after which the retail loan 
volume started to increase slightly. At the end of 
2014, American households owed in excess of usD 
11,800 billion, which is still some 7 per cent less 
than the 2008 record high.
8 for more details, see: Lentner, 2013 chapter 1
9 open society.
10 see: Lentner, 2013, chapter 1
11 on the government side, this is mitigated by the 
lowering of the personal income tax rate from 36 to 
16 per cent, then to 15 per cent in 2016, as well as 
the freezing and subsequent reduction of household 
public utility fees from 2010 and 1 January 2013 
respectively. The powers of the government impact-
ing the development of gross wages in the business 
sector is limited, but it does wish to mitigate income 
disparity in respect of Hungarian and western wages 
through fiscal regulation that generates effective sol-
vent demand.
12 Data culled from MNB statistics.
13 According to data research using MNB household 
statistics, this is an amount of Huf 10,587 billion.
14 The chart clearly illustrates the effect of the statutory 
conversion to forint in 2014.
15 Besides the government and the bank supervisory 
authority, the former management of the central 
bank also bears considerable professional responsi-
bility in the conditioning of interest rates and cur-
rency exchange rates at the time of the taking out 
of foreign currency loans. Monetary tools were 
available to align and bring closer interest rates that 
showed significant deviations.
16 The analysis of the indebtedness of companies is not 
a topic of this paper, but it should be mentioned 
here that the replacement of the foreign currency 
loan portfolio of the business sector with Huf loans 
– to a great extent – was implemented as part of the 
MNB’s funding for Growth scheme.
17 Especially because the loans taken out were, for the 
most part, not spent on producing exportable goods or 
were used to realise inefficient investments, or flowed 
to labour wages and state subventions with the aim of 
establishing full employment and financial security.
18 The free banking approach emphasises the inde-
pendence of banks as market players, according to 
which market players are able to create equilibrium 
and avoid crises and market asymmetry. By 2007, 
this interpretation proved to be an utter failure in 
the united states and by 2008 in continental Eu-
rope and Hungary as well.
19 for more details see: Kolozsi – Lentner – Tóth, 2010 
Also: Lentner, 2013, chapter 1
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20 As the internal resources and reserves of the planned 
economy have started to run out, external borrowing 
started with the goal of bridging the resulting gap, which 
later entailed increasing pressure from the IMf and the 
WB to apply neo-liberal economic policy principles.
21 American subprime mortgages were often covered 
with short-term hedging transactions. The foreign 
currency denominated lending created in Hungary 
following that example meant that banks were un-
able to cover the disbursed loans with optimal funds 
either in terms of tenor or in terms of swiss francs, 
although, it is true that they did conclude other 
types of hedging transactions.
22 My subjective research concept: The shortfall in 
cHf coverage played a significant role in brining 
about the problems. commercial banks did un-
doubtedly assign funding (albeit not in cHf) to 
over cHf-denominated loans, however, they did 
not assign optimally termed funding to appropriate-
ly cover these long-term loan arrangements, which 
created catastrophic problems for banks after the 
sudden increase in funding costs after 2007, after 
which banks tried to transfer the higher costs of ac-
quiring these funds onto the borrowers.
23 A complex explanation is provided in chapter 1 of 
The comprehensive Handbook of foreign currency 
Lending, Lentner, 2015.
24 Hungary was under the EDP since 2004, that is for 
9 years since the accession to the Eu.
25 To add to the household site: permanent retail for-
eign currency loan bailout packages and measures 
beginning in 2011 and the reinforcement of finan-
cial consumer protection represent consolidation by 
the state. on the other hand, the other (main) side 
of consolidation is the raising of income levels that 
are retained by households.
26 for the areas of national bankruptcy threat and ways to 
avoid it, see Lentner, 2014 (Public finance Quarterly).
27 Prepayment, exchange rate cap scheme, holding 
banks accountable. Moratorium on evictions. Re-
view of unfair contracts. Act XL of 2014 (the so-
called settlement Act), pursuant to which banks 
shall be obligated to settle with customers all over-
payments due to the exchange rate spread becoming 
null and void and the unilateral contract amend-
ments. The decree of the National Bank of Hungary 
(MNB) containing the detailed methodology of the 
settlement. It is worth noting that in addition to the 
review of the unfairness of retail loan agreements, 
the review of the unfairness vs fairness of local gov-
ernment loan agreements would also be justified.
28 I consider the reduction of repayment instalments 
and the principal amount to also be part of state co-
ordination.
29 Huf 3,250 billion, which allows the refinancing of 
high-risk foreign currency loans and taking out in-
vestment and capital raise loans from the MNB’s re-
financing facility. Another Huf 500 billion as part 
of the NHP+ to finance riskier sMEs.
30 obviously, there is no such thing as a finished, com-
pleted state in economic policy. Micro-problems 
arose in 2015 at the level of less regulated, so-called 
secondary banks: Buda cash, Quaestor, Hungária 
Értékpapír, széchenyi Bank and a few cooperative 
banks, which at the same time did not destabilise the 
banking sector.
31 The MNB’s foreign currency reserves as at 31 octo-
ber 2014 was EuR 34,218 billion, which shows that 
there was (more than sufficient) coverage to bail out 
foreign currency debtor families. source: MNB
32 for more on the conversion to Huf, see: Hoffmann 
– Kolozsi – Nagy, 2014
33 Preferring conservative foreign currency provision-
ing, we consider the Guidotti–Greenspan rule to 
prevail. In Q1 of 2015, the EuR 37 billion of the 
foreign currency reserve was more than enough to 
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cover the short-term external debt that has been 
dropping since 2011, the value of which at this time 
was EuR 22 billion.
34 of the official daily exchange rate of the MNB on 7 
November 2014 or the average exchange rate of the 
period since the decision of the curia on 16 June 
2014, banks must convert foreign currency loans to 
forint using the exchange rate that is more favour-
able for customers.
35 The autumn of 2008 is not to be counted into this 
interval as the joint impacts of erroneous Hungarian 
economic policy and the global economic crisis ‘up-
set’ Hungarian money markets and exchange rates as 
of october 2008.
36 Though the compensation provided to borrowers on 
account of the fair banking act and the unjustified, 
unilateral contract amendments is a financial burden 
on banks and limits the scope of their opportuni-
ties to generate raw profits, these acts actually lay the 
foundations for the ethical business management of 
banks, which foundations are essential for bank con-
solidation.
37 At the time of the 2007 us subprime crisis, banks 
were bailed out en masse in the us. There were, 
in fact, even countries that were bailed out such 
as Hungary in 2008, followed by Greece, cyprus, 
spain, Ireland, or countries in the case of which fur-
ther lenient fiscal policies were allowed (see france) 
in order to avoid total collapse. This is continued 
with the EcB’s QE asset purchase programme an-
nounced on 22 January 2015.
38 I followed the very same logic when explaining the 
justification of local government consolidation, 
Lentner, 2014. (Public finance Quarterly)
39 My position on the enforcement of the soft budget 
constraint, which in this particular case argues for 
consolidation (the mitigation of damages caused by 
the previous economic policy) and the implementa-
tion of this consolidation is in stark contrast with the 
views of János Kornai, who feels that the “sBc is a 
disease”.
40 In the interest of mitigation, a decision was also 
made on a –0.75 per cent interest on cHf bank de-
posits, but that did not have a significant effect on 
the strengthening of the swiss currency.
41 This indeed did happen on 22 January 2015, six 
days after the swiss decision and eight days after 
the decision of the court of Justice of the European 
union.
42 The removal of the peg resulted in the strengthen-
ing of the swiss currency, which is unfavourable in 
respect of export, though in the case of switzerland 
this item is manageable and not really of primal im-
portance, given the import and the near 30 per cent 
debt ratio, as well as the internationally dominant 
nature of its financial sector and the cHf.
43 In my calculation, – assuming permanent panic ef-
fects – the cHf exposure would have resulted in an 
increase of liabilities of Huf 2,000 billion.
44 The cHf 20 billion portfolio also includes the value 
of corporate foreign currency loans, the refinanc-
ing of which is made possible by the funding for 
Growth scheme of the MNB. The exchange rate 
deterioration did not impact household EuR loans 
either as on account of the conversion to Huf these 
items no longer existed and, furthermore, the EuR 
loans of local governments were also consolidated by 
the state.
45 Between 2010 and the beginning of 2015, the vol-
ume of government securities held by the popula-
tion increased five-fold.
46 for more details, see: Hoffmann – Kolozsi 2014, 
Kolozsi 2014
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